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The Ever-Changing Landscape of Informed
Consent and Whether the Obligation to
Explain a Procedure to the Patient May Be
Delegated
Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. and Maria Zambrano Steinhaus
Informed consent is required for every invasive medical
procedure, from getting your ears pierced to having an
abortion.

—Bob McDonnell1
Informed consent is an integral part of the shared decision
making process and requires a patient be informed of the benefits,
risks and alternatives to a medical procedure. 2 This information,
which requirement has been codified into the law and practice of
every healthcare provider, 3 helps a patient decide whether to
proceed with the recommended treatment plan. 4 Informed consent
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1. NR Interview, McDonnell Talks Super Tuesday, NAT’L REVIEW (Mar. 5, 2012, 5:00
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2012/03/mcdonnell-talks-super-tuesday-interview
[https://perma.cc/8ZCH-SR5E].
2. Definition of Informed Consent, NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms, NAT’L CANCER
INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/informed-consent
[https://perma.cc/G924-745W] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018); Medical Definition of Informed
Consent,
MEDICINENET,
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=22414
[https://perma.cc/HPG5-GRL2] (last updated May 13, 2016).
3. A Practical Guide to Informed Consent, Background: Requirements for Informed
Consent,
TEMPLE
HEALTH,
https://www.templehealth.org/ICTOOLKIT/html/ictoolkitpage1.html
[https://perma.cc/H939-GSVH] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
4. NAT’L C ANCER INST., supra note 2.
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has its foundation in the ethical notion of patient autonomy and
fundamental human rights. 5 After all, it is the patient’s decision
to determine what may be done to his or her body and to ascertain
the risks and benefits before undertaking a procedure. 6 On the
other hand, a physician’s role is to act as a facilitator in the
patient’s decision making process by providing information about
the planned treatment and to answer questions. 7 While the roles
of the patient and physician seem clearly defined, a number of
barriers present challenges in creating a process that guarantees a
patient understands a test or procedure. 8 This includes ineffective
communication between the doctor and patient.
The first part of this article will explore the liability of
various health care providers who participate in the informed
consent process, such as the physician, nurse, physician assistant
and hospital. The second section will examine whether the
treating physician may delegate the duty to explain the risks and
alternatives of a procedure to another. The controversial decision
of Shinal v. Toms, which mandates that the doctor must have a
one-on–one exchange with the patient in order to secure a valid
informed consent, 9 will also be explored. This recent ruling has
sent shock waves throughout the medical community causing a
reexamination of their informed consent policies.10
5. K H Satyanarayana Rao, Informed Consent: An Ethical Obligation or Legal
Compulsion?, 1 J. Cutaneous & Aesthetic Surgery 33, 33-34 (2008) (discussing the ethical
and legal reasons for informed consent and how the level of disclosure is always determined
on a case-by-case basis). As for a discussion of a patient’s autonomy, the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has noted that as an ethical doctrine, “[i]nformed consent
should be looked on as a process rather than a signature on a form. This process includes a
mutual sharing of information over time between the clinician and the patient to facilitate the
patient’s autonomy in the process of making ongoing choices.” Informed Consent, AM.
COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Aug. 2009), https://www.acog.org/ClinicalGuidance-and-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Informed-Consent
[https://perma.cc/R7Q5-UJGJ].
6. Rao, supra note 5, at 33.
7. Id.
8. Examples of barriers include the lack of information on the consent form,
ineffective doctor-patient communication, and a patient’s literacy and cultural issues.
Informed Consent: More Than Getting a Signature, JOINT COMM’N (Feb. 2016),
https://www.jointcommission.org/issues/article.aspx?Article=5kmqmwV14ugGGireNakQq
aCw1iqenpbl1IjAYdRsubU%3d [https://perma.cc/5E7B-WUKL].
9. 162 A.3d 429, 455 (Pa. 2017).
10. Dan Logsdon, Why Your Medical Consenting Practices Will Change, AGILE
CONSENT
(Sept.
18,
2017),
http://agileconsent.com/consenting-will-change
[https://perma.cc/L85M-S59A].
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent was first introduced to the American
public by Justice Cardozo in 1914 when he opined: “Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.” 11 The American Medical
Association incorporated this concept into its Code of Medical
Ethics by declaring that patients have the right to obtain
information and ask questions about proposed services so that
they can make appropriate decisions about their care. 12 This
ethical mandate is premised upon the idea of utility, or from the
advantage that arises from a patient’s active participation in the
decision making process regarding their health. 13 This
involvement is beneficial because it helps guard against treatment
that a person deems harmful and it provides a positive influence
on their welfare. 14 Regardless of how one views the purpose for
informed consent, the doctrine is firmly established in American
jurisprudence but remains a constant source of litigation as the
courts struggle over the meaning of these two simple words.15
Historically, participation in the medical decision-making
process was discouraged because physicians believed that
deception was a critical component to the practice of medicine. 16
The disclosure of the possible risks of a procedure was frowned

11. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Informed consent in an
international setting was initially set forth in the Declaration of Nuremberg in 1947 and
ratified by consecutive Declarations of Helsinki from 1964 to 2000. M Kottow, The
Battering of Informed Consent, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 565, 565 (2004).
12. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N (2016),
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/informed-consent
[https://perma.cc/5HLKAD5V].
13. AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 5.
14. Id.
15. A Westlaw search on informed consent on February 28, 2018 revealed over 30,000
appellate court decisions, trial court orders and administrative decisions (on file with the
Arkansas Law Review).
16. In the 1800’s, most physicians believed that a patient should not be informed about
critical conditions to facilitate care. Peter M. Murray, The History of Informed Consent, 10
IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 104, 104 (1990).
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upon because it might erode patient trust and would be
counterproductive to building a relationship of confidence. 17
The earliest example of a signed consent originated in
Turkey more than 500 years ago, but it was not until 1957, that a
lawsuit introduced the term “informed consent.” 18 In Salgo v.
Stanford, the court determined that a healthcare provider who
withholds any relevant facts needed to establish the foundation of
an intelligent informed consent violates the physician’s obligation
to the patient and exposes the doctor to liability. 19 Similarly, a
physician may not downplay the risks of an operation to induce
the patient’s consent. 20
Critical dialogue about the meaning of informed consent in
the context of medicine, law and ethics first took place in 1972.21
During that year, three decisions became the foundation for the
recognition of the principle as a legal precedent:22 Canterbury v.
Spence,23 Cobbs v. Grant,24 and Wilkerson v. Vesey.25 In fact, the

17. Id.
18. Historians studying the Ottoman Empire discovered a document signed by a
patient allowing the surgeon to remove a stone in the patient’s bladder. George Dvorsky, The
First-Known Medical Consent Form Dates Back to 1524, GIZMODO (Apr. 2, 2015, 1:20 PM),
https://io9.gizmodo.com/the-first-known-medical-consent-form-dates-back-to-15241695230695 [https://perma.cc/E5ZT-A49X].
19. 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). The court also concluded that each
patient’s case is different and that “in discussing the element of risk certain amount of
discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent.” Id.
20. Id.
21. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present
Challenges, 20 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 515, 516 (2011).
22. Id.
23. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064. In this case, a patient
sued the doctor for his failure to disclose the risk of paralysis during a laminectomy. Id. at
778. The court held that “due care normally demands that the physician warn the patient of
any risks to his well-being which contemplated therapy may involve.” Id. at 781.
24. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). The court noted that the patient was not informed of the
possibility of injuries to the spleen during duodenal ulcer repairs. Id. at 4. There is a “duty
of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the
dangers inherently and potentially involved in each.” Id. at 10.
25. 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972). The patient sued a radiologist for his failure to inform
the patient about the risk of radiation burns. Id. at 681. The court held that a “patient is
entitled to receive material information upon which he can base an informed consent.” Id. at
688.
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Canterbury decision established a more patient-oriented
disclosure:26
[T]he patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries
of the duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by
the patient’s need, and that need is the information material
to the decision. Thus, the test for determining whether a
particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the
patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision
must be unmasked. And, to safeguard the patient’s interest
in achieving his own determination on treatment, the law
must itself set the standard for adequate disclosure. 27

These judicial pronouncements prompted the American
Medical Association to acknowledge informed consent as “a
basic social policy” required to allow patients to formulate their
own decisions even if the physician disagrees with that process. 28
Initially, the lack of informed consent was considered an
encroachment of a person’s body integrity and constituted a
battery.29 The courts were of the opinion that operations or
procedures undertaken without obtaining a patient’s approval
constituted an intentional, unwarranted touching. 30 Over the
years, the failure to obtain the patient’s consent has shifted in a
number of jurisdictions to a negligence claim, 31 partially as the
result of the court’s desire not to find a well-intentioned physician
liable for battery.32
Surgeons must deal with informed consent on a routine basis
and the American College of Surgeons has noted that the principle

26. Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Informed Consent: I. History of Informed Consent,
ENCYLOPEDIA.COM
(2004),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/encyclopediasalmanacs-transcripts-and-maps/informed-consent-i-history-informed-consent
[https://perma.cc/FFR7-HZE4].
27. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
28. Encyclopedia of Bioethics, supra note 26.
29. Erin Sheley, Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent, 2015 BYU L. REV.
63, 68 (2015).
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id.
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is more than just a legal mandate. 33 It is a benchmark for proper
ethical practice that supplements the doctor/patient relationship
and has the ability to enhance the person’s care and treatment
outcomes. Consequently, surgeons are mandated to inform every
patient about his or her affliction and strategy for treatment. 34
This information must be explained “fairly, clearly, accurately,
and compassionately.”35 Physicians, at a minimum, should
discuss:
[1.]The nature of the illness and the natural consequences of
no treatment.
[2.]The nature of the proposed operation, including the
estimated risks of mortality and morbidity.
[3.]The more commonly known complications, which
should be described and discussed. The patient should
understand the risks as well as the benefits of the proposed
operation. The discussion should include a description of
what to expect during the hospitalization and posthospital
convalescence.
[4.]Alternative forms of treatment, including nonoperative
techniques.
[5.]A discussion of the different types of qualified medical
providers who will participate in their operation and their
respective roles.36

All states have enacted informed consent legislation in one
form or another. 37 The specific language of the individual laws
has changed over the years and differs from jurisdiction-tojurisdiction, but the general premise is that of patient
knowledge.38 The requirement is that the doctor must inform the
33. See
Informed
Consent,
AM.
COLL.
S URGEONS,
https://www.facs.org/education/patient-education/patient-resources/informed-consent
[https://perma.cc/XSA7-BR9L] (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
34. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. et al., Must Physicians Disclose an Alcohol or Substance
Abuse Problem When Requesting a Patient Sign an Informed Consent Document?, 91 N.D.
L. REV. 309, 317 (2015).
35. Statements on Principles, AM. COLL. S URGEONS (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.facs.org/about-acs/statements/stonprin#anchor171960 [https://perma.cc/63S9ENPS].
36. Id.
37. A Practical Guide to Informed Consent, supra note 3.
38. Understanding Informed Consent and Your Rights as a Patient, F INDLAW,
http://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/understanding-informed-consent-a-primer.html
[https://perma.cc/D6Z8-8G4P] (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
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patient of the important advantages, dangers and alternatives to
the proffered service and obtain the patient’s authorization to
proceed with treatment. 39 There are exceptions for emergencies
and legally determined mental incompetency or physical
incapacity.40
The type and amount of information that must be disclosed
is focused on two fundamental values owed by the physician:
beneficence, or the obligation “to do good[],” and respect for the
person’s autonomy. 41 These tenets have resulted in court-imposed
elements required for a patient to establish a malpractice claim
based on a lack of informed consent:
(1) . . . the person providing the professional treatment failed
to . . . inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks
associated with the treatment, and the alternatives, that a
reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed in the
same circumstances, (2) . . . a reasonably prudent patient in
the same position would not have undergone the treatment if
he or she had been fully informed, and (3) . . . the lack of
informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury[.] 42

There is always a grey area about how many potential risks
should be explained and how detailed the discussion should be
with the patient. While many jurisdictions apply the standard of
what a “reasonable physician” would disclose or what a
“reasonable patient” would want to know, this language still
leaves room for interpretation.43 Therefore, it is not surprising that
litigation involving informed consent has increased especially
since the Internet provides patients with the ability to learn more
information about a doctor or to better understand their medical
condition. Attorneys have also become much more creative in
their attempts to expand physician liability. 44

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Sheley, supra note 29, at 69 (quoting Foote v. Rajadhyax, 268 A.D.2d 745, 745
(2000)).
42. Godel v. Goldstein, 155 A.D.3d 939, 941-42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). As noted in
Matthies v. Mastromonaco, a healthcare provider is required to reveal that information which
will allow a reasonable patient to consider and weigh knowledgeably the alternatives
available and the risks associated with each procedure. 733 A.2d 456, 460 (N.J. 1999).
43. A Practical Guide to Informed Consent, supra note 3.
44. See Hodge et al., supra note 34, at 319.
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Case law demonstrates that a healthcare provider may no
longer assume that it is sufficient to merely disclose the material
risks of a procedure. Lawsuits are now physician-specific and
may be based on a doctor’s failure to disclose that he has been the
subject of prior lawsuits or disciplinary action, 45 the failure to
reveal important physical or mental health issues involving the
physician,46 the investigational status of a device being
employed,47 a doctor’s lack of experience, 48 a physician’s alcohol
or drug dependency, 49 success rates for a technique or

45. In Tsouristakis v. Guerrino, the court found that a dentist was not obligated to
inform a patient that he had been sued by other patients or had been the subject of a
disciplinary proceeding. No. 1234/06, 2007 WL 7314864, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 16,
2007). See also Curran v. Buser, 711 N.W.2d 562, 570 (Neb. 2006) (holding that a physician
did not have to disclose his disciplinary history to patient unless doctors in similar locations
and situations would ordinarily disclose their disciplinary history).
46. See Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Grp., 45 S.W.3d 24, 26-27 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000). There, the court held that a surgeon’s disabling hand condition was relevant to the
informed consent claim. Id. at 35. In May v. Cusick, a surgeon had suffered two prior strokes,
which were not disclosed to the patient. No. 99-2520, 2001 WL 436286, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
May 1, 2001). The plaintiff alleged that the doctor may have suffered ill effects from the
strokes that affected his ability to operate on her. Id. The court dismissed the lack of informed
consent claim and opined that the plaintiff failed to show any evidence that the past minor
strokes presented any risk to her. Id. at *5.
47. Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding
that a surgeon was not required to inform a patient about the FDA’s investigational status of
pedicle screws, but suggesting that the jury can consider whether this information would be
“material to a prudent patient’s decision”); see also DeNeui v. Wellman, No. CIV. 07-4172KES, 2009 WL 4847086, at *4 (D.S.D. Dec. 9 2009) (holding that the “‘reasonable person’
standard indicate[d] that the issue of materiality of the off-label use of BMP is to be decided
by a jury”).
48. Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Del. 1997) (holding that a doctor’s
qualifications were relevant to the issue of informed consent). Courts in Maryland and
Wisconsin have issued similar decisions. See Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md.
2006); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996). A narrower approach was
followed in Whiteside v. Lukson, where the court held that a physician’s lack of experience
in handling a specific procedure was not a material risk that had to be disclosed. 947 P.2d
1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). In Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., the court
established that “misrepresented or exaggerated physician experience would have to
significantly increase a risk of a procedure in order for it to affect the judgment of a
reasonably prudent patient in an informed consent case.” 800 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002).
49. Hodge et al., supra note 34, at 320-21.

2019

INFORMED CONSENT

735

procedure,50 a doctor’s HIV positive status,51 the obligation to
reveal that the person is part of a research study52 as well as the
doctor’s monetary interest in a technique. 53 Another source of
litigation is whether the informed consent form must be a signed
written document. 54

II. WHO HAS THE DUTY TO OBTAIN A PATIENT’S
INFORMED CONSENT?
Two of the latest disputes involving informed consent deal
with which healthcare provider must explain a procedure to the
patient and whether a physician may delegate that duty to a nurse,
physician assistant, or hospital employee.

A. LIABILITY OF A HOSPITAL
1. Respondent Superior, Ostensible Agency and
Corporate Negligence.
Medical procedures are regularly performed in a hospital.
Therefore, medical institutions are often sued for failing to obtain
50. In Wlosinski v. Cohn, the court determined that a doctor’s success rate in
performing kidney transplants did not constitute a risk that had to be disclosed to a patient.
713 N.W.2d 16, 21-22 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). See also Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 60607 (Cal. 1993) (noting that the court could not determine as a matter of law that a cancer
patient’s statistical life expectancy information before treatment is material to an informed
consent).
51. In Faya v Almaraz, the court held that a doctor who is HIV positive may have
breached his legal duty in failing to disclose this information before performing invasive
surgery. 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993). But see K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561
(Minn. 1995); Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995) (holding that a doctor
did not have to disclose an HIV status).
52. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). The court held that
when it comes to research studies, “[a] human subject is entitled to all material information.”
Id. at 844 (emphasis original).
53. In Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., the court opined that “a reasonable patient
would want to know whether a physician has an economic interest that might affect the
physician’s professional judgment . . . . ‘[A] sick patient deserves to be free of any
reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit motive.’” 793 P.2d
479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (quoting Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. Med. Examiners, 249
Cal. App. 2d 124, 132 (1967)).
54. Some courts have held that patient’s informed consent does not have to be in
writing. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D.S.C. 1995); Maerklein
v. Smith, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Colo. 1954); Yahn v. Folse, 639 So. 2d 261, 265 (La. Ct.
App. 1993); Patterson v. Van Wiel, 570 P.2d 931, 934 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).
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or insure that a patient has executed the informed consent
document. Many medical facilities in the twenty-first century
have created multimedia platforms that walk the patient and
physician through a procedure. 55 These platforms also document
the patient’s agreement or refusal to proceed and incorporate the
informed consent form into the patient’s medical chart. 56 While
physicians universally remain responsible for defects in the
process, hospitals have escaped liability in most cases. 57 This
history, however, has not stopped counsel from suing hospitals on
three theories: respondent superior, ostensible agency and
corporate negligence. 58
In Davis v. Hoffman, the plaintiff suffered from a fibroid
uterus and had a pre-surgical interview with the surgeon’s nurse. 59
The patient maintained that she specifically told the doctor and
nurse that she refused to have a hysterectomy. 60 During the
operation, it became necessary to undertake such operation but no
one awakened the patient to obtain her consent. 61 Suit was
instituted against the hospital, surgeon and nurse for a battery. 62
The plaintiff maintained that the hospital was liable for the actions
of the doctor and nurse under the theories of respondent-superior,
ostensible agency and corporate negligence. 63 The hospital

55. Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent
Liability for Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2006).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1205; see also Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that hospitals have no duty to obtain informed consent from the patient). One author,
however, has suggested that hospitals may one day incur liability for the failure of a doctor,
who works primarily at the facility, to obtain a patient’s informed consent. Shelley S. Fraser,
Hospital Liability: Drawing A Fine Line With Informed Consent in Today’s Evolving Health
Care Arena, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 253, 253 (2004). This is based on the fact that medical
facilities exert some degree of control over the informed consent process as the result of
policies and procedures, the supplying of forms, accreditation standards and by employing
physicians to perform tasks that require informed consent. Id.
58. Gatter, supra note 55, at 1218-19, 1251; see also Davis, 972 F. Supp. at 312. Since
1967, courts all over the country have held that medical institutions do not have a duty to
inform a patient about the specifics of a procedure or treatment alternatives, or to investigate
whether the physician has secured the patient’s informed consent because informed consent
is the responsibility of the physician. Gatter, supra note 55, at 1216.
59. 972 F. Supp. at 311.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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moved for dismissal which was granted. 64 The court noted that
Pennsylvania imposes an obligation upon the surgeon to secure
the patient’s informed consent. 65 This requirement is limited to
the doctor and a hospital has no such obligation, even if one of
the institution’s doctors performs the procedure with hospital
personnel.66 An exception occurs if the hospital voluntarily
assumes the duty to obtain the release. 67 In that case, the hospital
must not act negligently. 68
Ostensible agency is a valid and recognizable theory by
which a healthcare provider may incur liability if the hospital
holds out the negligent physician as one of its employees. 69
However, in Davis v. Hoffman, the plaintiff could not establish
ostensible agency because, by her own assertions in the
complaint, she entered into a doctor-patient relationship with the
defendant doctor directly and the hospital did not refer her to the
surgeon.70 As for the claim of corporate negligence, the court
noted that to prove such claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate the
hospital’s “failure to uphold the proper standard of care owed to
patient.”71 Such count is predicated under the doctrine that a
hospital must: “1) ‘use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe
and adequate facilities;’ 2) ‘select and retain only competent
physicians;’ 3) ‘oversee all persons who practice medicine within
its walls;’ and 4) ‘formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and
policies to ensure quality care.’” 72 Nevertheless, the court pointed
out that a hospital may not be liable for corporate negligence for
the failure to obtain an informed consent.73
The Supreme Court of Nebraska also agreed that a hospital
does not have an independent duty to warn a patient about the

64. Davis, 972 F. Supp. at 311.
65. Id. (citing Friter v. Iolab Corp., A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
66. Id. at 312 (citing Friter, A.2d at 1113).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(holding that ostensible agency is established if the patient looks at the institution rather than
the individual doctor for care and if the hospital “holds-out” the doctor as its employee).
70. Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
71. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991)).
72. Id. (quoting Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707).
73. Id.
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risks and advantages of a procedure. 74 In Giese v. Stice, the court
opined that the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the
question have declined to impose liability upon a hospital to
obtain a patient’s informed consent. 75 This court concluded that
only the treating doctor has the “education, expertise, skill, and
training” needed to treat a patient and ascertain what a person
needs to know in order to provide a proper informed consent. 76

2. Procedure Performed By A Hospital Employee
A distinguishable result is achieved if the hospital’s
employees are performing the procedure and they fail to inform

74. Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Neb. 1997). The courts have declined to
impose a duty upon the hospital to obtain the informed consent document unless they
“‘specifically assumed the duty’ or the physician was an agent of the hospital.” Robertson v.
Iuliano, No. RDB-10-1319, 2012 WL 6138441, at *3, (D. Md. 2012) (quoting Valles v.
Albert, Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). The court in
Robertson found that the doctor has exclusive control in the manner in which he/she obtains
the informed consent and dismissed the case against the doctor’s employer. Id. at *5.
75. Giese, 567 N.W.2d at 162 (citing Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
76. Id. at 163; see also Krane v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo.
App. 1987) (holding a hospital does not have an obligation to inform the patient of the nature
of the procedure to be employed and the risks involved, so the hospital has no requirement
to secure an informed consent comparable to that which the surgeon is required to obtain);
Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (holding a hospital has no duty to
obtain a patient’s informed consent to a surgery to be performed by a surgeon who is not an
employee of the hospital); Pickle v. Curns, 435 N.E.2d 877, 880-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(holding a hospital has no requirement to notify a patient about the risks of surgery); Lincoln
v. Gupta, 370 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a doctor has the
exclusive obligation to notify a patient about the risks related to a medical procedure);
Baltzell v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 718 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a hospital
has no requirement to tell a patient about the chances of an infection from surgery); Johnson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding a hospital has
no duty to obtain informed consent when a non-employee orders a procedure, but the hospital
employees perform the procedure); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 3 (N.Y. 1957)
(holding that a hospital which did not retain the surgeon had no obligation to acquire a
patient’s informed consent for the planned surgery); Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16,
17-18 (N.D. 1989) (holding that a hospital generally has no duty to obtain a patient’s
informed consent); Goss v. Okla. Blood Inst., 856 P.2d 998, 1007 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990)
(holding that a hospital has no requirement to notify a patient of the relevant risks of the
surgery nor must the facility tell the patient about alternative procedures); Ritter v. Delaney,
790 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a hospital has no obligation to obtain
a patient’s informed consent simply because the doctor had told a nurse to obtain the patient’s
informed consent).
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the patient of the known risks.77 In Keel v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, a patient’s personal physician ordered a dye enhanced CT
scan to be performed at the medical center. 78 The plaintiff was not
provided with any information about the risks of the procedure
and subsequently developed thrombophlebitis at the injection
location.79 The court found the hospital liable under an informed
consent theory since its employees administered the test and
failed to explain the risks of the procedure. 80 It noted that “a juror
might reasonably infer . . . that St. Elizabeth’s utter silence as to
risks amounted to an assurance that there were none, whereas . . .
St. Elizabeth itself, as the health care provider performing the
treatment, recognized the substantial possibility of
complications[.]”81
3. Clinical Investigations
A hospital may be found liable for failing to obtain an
informed consent if the medical institution is participating in a
clinical investigation, 82 in which case the hospital is required to
ensure that informed consent is obtained from any patient
participating in the study. 83 In Friter v. Lolab Corp., the patient
was the recipient of an intraocular lens that was implanted at Wills
Eye Hospital. 84 The hospital was an approved institution for
conducting experimental studies and was bound by FDA rules
that required the informed consent of any patient participating in
experimental treatment. 85 The patient was never told prior to his
eye surgery that he was participating in an experimental
program.86 Subsequently, he developed numerous complications
and sued the hospital for failing to obtain his informed consent. 87
The court noted that historically only the physician performing

77. See Keel v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 842 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1992) (finding the
hospital had a duty due to the statutory definition of “health care providers”).
78. Id. at 860-61.
79. Id. at 861.
80. Id. at 862.
81. Id.
82. See Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
83. Id. at 1113.
84. Id. at 1111.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1111-12.
87. Friter, 607 A.2d at 1112.
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the operation is required to obtain a patient’s informed consent
and that it could not find any Pennsylvania case imposing an
independent duty on a non-physician to secure a patient’s
informed consent. 88 However, the hospital, as a participant in a
clinical study under the auspices of the FDA, has an affirmative
obligation to protect the right of individuals and that informed
consent notifies the person of the risks associated with an
investigational study. 89

4. Duty of a Hospital and Physician as Joint Health
Care Providers
Another argument is that a hospital and physician have a
“joint duty” to obtain the patient’s informed consent as “health
care providers” as that term is defined in the informed consent
statutes.90 This position was rejected in Alexander v. Gosner91 and
Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank.92 Under
Washington law, “‘health care providers’ are subject to suit for
breach of the duty to secure an informed consent by a patient.” 93
While conceding that the statute encompasses a hospital within
the definition of “health care providers,” the court refused to
extend an equal informed consent requirement to every entity that
falls within the definition. 94 A hospital does not possess specific
knowledge regarding a patient and its employees are only aware
of the general risk relevant to all patients. 95 The information
88. Id. at 1113.
89. Id. at 1113-14. A similar result in finding a hospital liable occurred in Jones v.
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 813 F. Supp. 1125, 1130-31 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
In this case, the hospital, on its own volition, prepared a consent form that contained the
name and logo of the medical college and hospital. Id. at 1131. Under the circumstances, the
court determined that a hospital has no duty to secure informed consent, but once it
voluntarily assumes that duty, a plaintiff may have a valid cause of action based on the
consent form. Id. at 1130-32.
90. Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Neb. 1997) (The plaintiff argued that there
was a joint duty between the hospital and physician because the informed consent statute
uses the term “health care providers”; however, the court rejected this argument.).
91. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gosner, 711 P.2d 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)).
92. Id. (citing Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815 (Wash.
1990)).
93. Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815, 822 (Wash. 1990)
(citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.7.050 (current version at WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
7.7.050 (West 2011))).
94. Giese, 567 N.W.2d at 164.
95. Howell, 785 P.2d at 822-23.
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pertaining to the risks of a specific service or procedure are better
left to the patient’s physician. 96 Except in a very unusual
circumstance, the hospital’s staff is not required to obtain an
informed consent from the patient. 97

5. Hospital Supplies the Informed Consent Document
A number of hospitals supply the informed consent forms
used by physicians to secure the patient’s authorization. 98 This
has triggered lawsuits that assert, albeit unsuccessfully, that the
hospital assumes the duty to obtain the patient’s consent when it
provides the forms to the patient. 99 For instance, in Robertson v.
Iuliano, the plaintiff underwent back surgery and claimed that he
was never informed that the procedure carried the risk of infection
and that he would have refused the surgery if he had been made
aware of this problem. 100 The facts showed that the hospital
routinely supplied the informed consent forms as a precautionary
measure to the physicians on its premises.101 The court ruled that
the hospital’s supplying of these forms did not impose an
independent duty upon the facility to ensure the patient’s consent
was obtained.102 The court rationalized that the duty to inform the
person of the risks of the procedure rests exclusively with the
doctor because “unlike the physician, the patient is untrained in
medical science, and therefore depends completely on the trust
and skill of his physician for the information on which he makes
his decision.”103

96. Id. at 823.
97. Id.
98. See Robertson v. Iuliano, No. RDB-10-1319, 2012 WL 6138441, at *4 (D. Md.
Dec. 10, 2012) (holding a hospital did not assume a duty by supplying consent forms).
99. Id. at *4-5.
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id. at *4.
102. Id.
103. Robertson, 2012 WL 6138441, at *2 (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014,
1020 (Md. 1977)) (quotation marks omitted).
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B. LIABILITY OF THE DOCTOR’S STAFF
1. Nurse
Nurses possess superior medical skill and knowledge;
therefore, they must use the degree of care that a reasonable nurse
practitioner would employ under the circumstances. 104 However,
this type of health care professional does not have a duty to obtain
a patient’s informed consent.105 The nurse’s primary task is to
assist the physician. 106 More than one-half of the states have
considered this issue and have concluded that nurses do not have
an independent duty to secure the consent form. 107
In Wells v. Storey, the court declined to create a duty
requiring a nurse to obtain a patient’s informed consent. 108 The
physician is the only one uniquely qualified through education
and training to determine the information necessary to share with
the patient.109 Likewise, in Foflygen v. Zemel, the court noted that
104. In Berdyck v. Shinde, the court noted that nurses could be held liable if they
breach their duty of care by failing to inform the doctor about a patient’s condition. 613
N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (Ohio 1993).
105. See Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that
“Pennsylvania law generally imposes no duty on persons other than surgeons to obtain
informed consent before performing surgery. Thus, courts have not imposed the duty on
nurses.”).
106. Id. (citing Jones v. Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 813 F. Supp. 1125,
1130 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
107. Wells v. Storey, 792 So. 2d 1034, 1038 (Ala. 1999) (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 1039.
109. Id. at 1038-39 (quoting Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992)).; see also Krane v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo.
App. 1987) (holding that since the hospital does not know the patient’s history or details of
the surgery, it is the surgeon who must obtain the informed consent); Petriello v. Kalman,
576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (The court held that although the hospital drafted the
consent form and had rules to make sure the surgeon obtained it before surgery, the rules did
not authorize the operating room nurse “to countermand the judgment of the attending
physician as to whether the patient had given an informed consent.”); Valcin v. Pub. Health
Tr. of Dade Cty., 473 So. 2d 1297, 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hosp., 228 S.E.2d 596, 598 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1976); Winters v. Podzamsky, 621 N.E.2d 72, 75-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Auler v.
Van Natta, 686 N.E.2d 172, 174-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d
156, 163 (Neb. 1997)); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa
1987); Kelley v. Kitahama, 675 So. 2d 1181, 1182-83 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Lincoln v. Gupta,
370 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Ackerman v. Lerwick, 676 S.W.2d 318, 32021 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Neb. 1997); Baird v. Am.
Med. Optics, 693 A.2d 904, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 483
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a nurse is not a joint-tortfeasor.110 The patient underwent a
stomach stapling procedure which resulted in multiple
complications.111 Two of the defendants, a nurse and a physician
who performed the plaintiff’s pre-surgery physical examination,
moved to have the claims against them dismissed. 112 The plaintiff
countered that they were joint tortfeasors who acted in concert
with the other defendants in failing to obtain the patient’s
informed consent.113 The court held that only the physician who
performs the operation has a duty to secure the informed consent
of the patient. 114 Therefore, neither the nurse nor the physician
who conducted the physical examination could be liable as joint
tortfeasors with the surgeon. 115
Does a hospital assume a duty to obtain a patient’s informed
consent when a physician orders a nurse, an employee of the
hospital, to secure the patient’s informed consent? This question
was answered in Ritter v. Delaney.116 The plaintiff underwent a
procedure to increase the blood flow to her brain which resulted
in severe complications. 117 The plaintiff argued that the hospital
was liable because it became an agent of the surgeon when the
doctor asked the hospital’s nurse to obtain the signed informed
consent form.118 The court concluded that the acts of the nurse did
not create a duty on the hospital to obtain informed consent. 119
N.Y.S.2d 568, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.W.2d 392, 395-96 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1981); Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 17-18 (N.D. 1989) (quoting Krane v.
Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. App. 1987)); Goss v. Okla. Blood Inst.,
856 P.2d 998, 1007 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 15051 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Boney v. Mother Frances Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 140, 142-43 (Tex.
App. 1994); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815, 822-23 (Wash.
1990); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.W.2d 446, 459 (W. Va. 1982); Mathias v. St. Catherine’s Hosp.,
569 N.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
110. 615 A.2d 1345, 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), overruled by Shinal v. Toms, 162
A.3d 429, 455 (Pa. 2017) (overruling Foflygen to the extent it permitted a physician to fulfill
duty of informed consent through an intermediary).
111. Id. at 1348. The plaintiff alleged the operation caused her to suffer from, among
other things, a pulmonary embolism, respiratory problems, phlebitis of the arm, stroke, and
a carotid artery occlusion. Id.
112. Id. at 1351.
113. Id. at 1352.
114. Id. at 1353.
115. Foflygen, 615 A.2d at 1353.
116. 790 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id. at 31-32.
119. Id. at 32.
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The court also stated that the obligation to secure the patient’s
consent belongs to the surgeon, and asking the nurse to obtain the
patient’s signature does not make the nurse the doctor’s agent. 120
On the other hand, if a nurse assumes the obligation of
informing a patient about the risks of a procedure and that
explanation falls short of the prudent nurse standard of care,
liability will attach under the laws of negligence. 121 Likewise, a
nurse who fails to report an inconsistency between the patient’s
understanding of the procedure and a test or operation being
performed may be exposed to civil liability. 122 For instance, in
Urban v. Spohn Hospital, a patient complained to a hospital nurse
that she did not desire or consent to a hemorrhoidectomy and the
nurse failed to report that fact to the specialist or to someone in a
managerial status. 123 The court determined that this type of
omission can result in liability against the nurse or hospital. 124

2. Physician Assistants
A physician assistant (“PA”) is licensed to examine,
diagnose and treat patients, and to prescribe medication. 125 The
PA augments the delivery of high quality health care and their
education and training allows for their treatment of patients with
significant autonomy. 126 This includes the ability to treat minor
trauma by suturing, splinting and casting. 127 They also author
progress notes, advise patients, and order therapy. 128
Physician assistants have become involved in obtaining a
patient’s informed consent. As the American Academy of
120. Id.
121. Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Titchnell v.
United States, 681 F.2d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 1982); Baur v. Mesta Machine Co., 176 A.2d 684,
688 (Pa. 1962); Navarro v. George, 615 A.2d 890, 892 (Pa. 1992).
122. Russell G. Thornton, Informed Consent, BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CENTER (April 13,
2000), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1312305 [https://perma.cc/K8E9YB29].
123. 869 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex. App. 1993).
124. Id. at 453.
125. Physician
Assistant,
EXPLOREHEALTHC AREERS.ORG,
https://explorehealthcareers.org/career/medicine/physician-assistant
[https://perma.cc/ZNN4-8QBC] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
126. Id.
127. Physician Assistant, MAYO C LINIC, http://www.mayo.edu/mayo-clinic-schoolof-health-sciences/careers/physician-assistant [https://perma.cc/U33Z-ZGR7] (last visited
Sept. 22, 2018).
128. Id.
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Physician Assistants’ Guidelines for Ethical Conduct indicates, a
PA may be part of the informed consent process as long as the
information provided “is comprehendible to a competent
patient . . . .”129 Does this undertaking expose the physician
assistant to liability for a defective informed consent? Some
courts have refused to extend such liability since the physician
remains the person performing the surgery or procedure.130
In Baker v. Williams, the plaintiff sustained a work related
injury and was treated by an orthopedic surgeon who
recommended spinal surgery. 131 The doctor was assisted in his
practice by the defendant, a physician assistant. 132 The plaintiff
signed a consent form which did not mention the possible use of
hardware.133 On the day of surgery, the PA was instructed to
secure a new consent form which mentioned the need for
instrumentation.134 The surgery was done in the nature of a fusion
using a BAK cage. 135 Two weeks post-surgery, the plaintiff
developed complications, suffered a stroke and the fusion
failed.136 Suit was filed against the doctor and PA. 137 The claim
against the PA was premised on the failure to obtain the patient’s
informed consent.138 That assertion, however, was dismissed by
way of summary judgment.139
On appeal, the court examined the duties of a physician
assistant as set forth by statute which noted that the PA may
perform medical services within the scope of his/her education,
training and experience, which are delegated by the supervising
doctor.140 However, the listed duties do not include securing of a

129. Rose Clifford, Who Can Obtain a Patient’s Consent? Answer Elusive, THE
MEDICAL-LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.medical-legalnews.com/who-canobtain-a-patients-consent-answer-elusive
[https://perma.cc/M6JX-8WLS]
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
130. Bradley v. Sugarbaker, 809 F.3d 8, 20-22 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that the legal
responsibility for the physician assistant’s action falls on the supervising doctor).
131. 825 So. 2d 563, 565 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Baker, 825 So. 2d at 565.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 566.
140. Id. at 570.
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patient’s informed consent. 141 That reasonability under the statute
remains with the physician. 142 The PA is merely acting as the
agent of the surgeon, who as principal, is responsible for the
conduct of the agent.143 Therefore, the dismissal of the claim
against the physician assistant was, proper. 144
However, when the PA is the person performing the
procedure, the PA may be exposed to liability if he does not obtain
proper informed consent. Zarata v. Buitriago involves a medical
malpractice and lack of informed consent claim against a PA as
the result of the assistant’s administration of a cortisone injection
in the patient’s hand. 145 The plaintiff developed a staph infection
which the plaintiff asserts was never explained as a risk of the
procedure.146 The claim was dismissed because the physician
assistant had properly informed the patient about the proposed
injection and viable alternatives. 147 The PA also showed that a
reasonably prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would still
have undergone the procedure performed by the assistant despite
the known risks. 148

III. INFORMED CONSENT AS A NONDELEGABLE DUTY
Pennsylvania has become the battle ground for one of the
latest disputes involving informed consent149 – whether the
physician must personally explain the procedure to the patient or
whether the task can be delegated to another person? This
question has caught the attention of health care providers around
the country.
Case law clearly demonstrates that the treating physician has
the affirmative duty to obtain a patient’s consent to a procedure
or test.150 This obligation is not the independent responsibility of
141. Baker, 825 So. 2d at 570.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 571.
144. Id.
145. 107 A.D.3d 977, 977-78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
146. Id. at 978.
147. Id. at 979-80.
148. Id.
149. See generally Bulman v. Meyers, 467 A.2d 1353 (Pa. Super. 1983), overruled by
Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017).
150. See, e.g., Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 433, 457 (Pa. 2017).

2019

INFORMED CONSENT

747

a nurse, hospital, surgical assistant or referring doctor nor is the
duty reduced or eliminated by having another healthcare
professional secure the patient’s consent. 151 Busy doctors,
however, frequently have other staff members explain the
proposed procedure to a patient. 152 This is especially true in the
era of a team-based approach where multiple professionals
participate in the patient’s care: “[r]equiring the surgeon to give
all of the informed consent all of the time breaks down the team
approach.”153
From a risk management view point, this delegation by
physicians is fraught with danger. Agreeing to undergo a medical
procedure is a complex process and patients must possess the
necessary information to make an informed decision. This
frequently includes the need to have an exchange with the
physician in order to obtain answers to questions. 154 One other
than the treating doctor may not possess the requisite knowledge
or may provide incomplete information in response to an inquiry.
Absent a direct discussion between the doctor and patient, the
physician will remain uncertain as to whether the patient
understands the advantages, dangers and likelihood of success of
a procedure.155

151. Thornton, supra note 122.
152. Mark Crane, Legal Risks of Delegating Informed Consent to an NP or PA,
MEDSCAPE (Nov.
30, 2017), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/887074_2
[https://perma.cc/6FLL-4DG8]. In today’s era of receiving information in a visual format, it
is not surprising that video-based consent improves informed consent comprehension. E.W.
Hall, et. al., Use of Videos Improves Informed Consent Comprehension in Web-Based
Surveys Among Internet-Using Men Who Have Sex With Men: A Randomized Controlled
Trial, 19 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 1, 2, 10 (2017). These discussions are also supplemented
by medical posters, brochures, physiological models and videos. Id. at 2, 11. In fact, it is
noted that the use of brochures and video tapes to educate patients are “legally safe” and are
advantageous because they will also provide uniformity of content and cover all of the
necessary risks and alternatives to a procedure. Informed Consent Forms and Patient
Brochures, ECT.ORG (July 27, 2006, 10:21 PM), http://www.ect.org/?p=534
[https://perma.cc/89NR-D85H].
153. See Crane, supra note 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Informed Consent: Are Physicians Putting Themselves at Risk by Delegating,
AXOBLOG (Dec. 21, 2017), https://axobill.com/blog/informed-consent-physicians-puttingrisk-delegating [https://perma.cc/88GQ-5RJ8].
155. Michael C. Ksiazek, Can a Doctor Delegate Duty to Obtain Informed Consent
to a Staff Member?, THE NATIONAL L AW REVIEW (July 6, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/can-doctor-delegate-duty-to-obtain-informedconsent-to-staff-member [https://perma.cc/WX37-AFJF].

748

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:3

Asking another heath care professional to secure the
patient’s informed consent may not be ideal from a risk
management point of view but is it a non-delegable duty owed
exclusively by the physician? Based upon a recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision, the answer is an emphatic “yes.” 156 In
fact, some have opined that this ruling “will affect every
physician, physician assistant, and nurse practitioner in the
US.”157

A. HISTORY LEADING UP TO SHINAL V. TOMS
Pennsylvania initially considered the question of informed
consent being a non-delegable duty in the 1983 case of Bulman v.
Myers.158 The plaintiff was admitted to the hospital because of
impacted wisdom teeth. 159 Subsequent to having her teeth
removed, she developed a loss of taste and sensation in her tongue
as well as slurred speech. 160 Bulman sued the oral surgeon
claiming that the surgery was done without her informed
consent.161 A defense verdict was returned and the patient
appealed claiming that the trial judge failed to charge the jury that
a patient cannot formulate a proper informed consent when the
risks of the procedure are explained by a nurse and not the
surgeon.162 The plaintiff asserted that only the physician can
effectively explain all the necessary information. 163 The court on
appeal disagreed and noted that the key factor is the scope of the
information provided and not the identity of the person making
the communication.164 Other courts have issued similar rulings.165
156. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 433 (Pa. 2017).
157. Logston, supra note 10. In fact, the author predicted that “[t]his new ruling will
become a precedent ruling in all informed cases and although it started in Pennsylvania, the
fall out will affect every physician in every state.” Id.
158. 467 A.2d 1353-55 (Pa. Super. 1983), overruled by Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429,
433 (Pa. 2017).
159. Id. at 1354.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Bulman, 467 A.2d at 1355.
164. Id.
165. Foflygen v. Alleghany Gen. Hosp., 723 A.2d 705, 710-11 (Pa. Super. 1990),
overruled by Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 433, 453 (Pa. 2017). This court followed the
Bulman ruling and dismissed the plaintiff’s case holding that the scope of the nurse
assistant’s disclosure to patient was proper. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 453 (Pa. 2017).
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The delegation of informed consent by the physician is also
allowed by statute in a number of jurisdictions. For instance,
Kentucky provides:
[I]nformed consent . . . shall be considered valid only if a
physician or a licensed nurse, physician assistant, or social
worker to whom the responsibility has been delegated by the
physician has a face-to-face meeting with the patient and
both parties are physically located in the same room or are
participating in real-time visual telehealth services initiated
by the physician or by the patient. 166

Cases from some states indicate that informed consent is a
“non-delegable” duty167 but a reading of these decisions fails to
proclaim that only the doctor may talk to the patient which has
resulted in inconsistent holdings.168 These decisions merely hold
that the physician has the ultimate responsibility for obtaining the
patient’s informed consent and that the physician remains
ultimately responsible for defects in the informed consent process
if obtained by someone else.169

166. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.724 (West 2016).
167. Boney v. Mother Francis Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding
that the duty to obtain informed consent is “imposed solely upon the treating doctor” and
that it is non-delegable, and therefore the hospital was not liable); see also Espalin v.
Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. App. 2000).
168. Defranco v. Hamra, No. 05-97-02173-CV, 200 WL 567220, at *3 (Tex. App.
2000) (holding that although the physician remains responsible for obtaining informed
consent, “the physician shall be considered to have complied with the disclosure requirement
as long as the patient receives information about the risks and hazards of the procedure”
regardless whether this information was received directly from the surgeon).
169. Ritter v. Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that even if the
hospital nurse obtained the informed consent form from the patient, after being asked by the
surgeon, the only one liable for any defects on the consent would be the surgeon). See also
Nevauex v. Park Place Hosp., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that “the
duty of securing the patient’s informed consent rests on the doctor treating the patient” and
neither the hospital nor the technician owed such a duty to patient); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp.,
664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding that only the surgeon had the duty to obtain
informed consent). The Veterans Administration has a policy on informed consent that is not
limited to a physician providing the necessary information. Ethical Considerations:
Informed
Consent
Process,
V.A.
HEALTH
ADMIN.
RES.
&
DEV.,
https://www.research.va.gov/programs/pride/resources/Informed_Consent_Process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93CY-BH7W] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). That policy notes that is not
limited to a physician providing the necessary information. That policy states that “a person
knowledgeable about the consenting process and the research to be conducted must obtain
the informed consent.” Id.
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Veith v. O’Brien is illustrative.170 The plaintiff was an obese
man who underwent bariatric surgery and developed a large
abdominal hematoma, pneumonia, infection and abdominal
leakage.171 He underwent additional surgery at which time it was
discovered that he had developed a twisted bowel. 172 The plaintiff
sued the surgeon and hospital for the failure to obtain his
informed consent, and offered as evidence, a booklet the doctor’s
nurse had given the patient about the surgery. 173 The doctor’s
nurse testified that it was her responsibility to distribute the
booklet by mail before the consult or in person at the time of the
visit.174 Concerning the negligence of this employee, the court
reiterated the long standing rule that the physician has the duty to
obtain the patient’s informed consent. 175 While the doctor’s
subordinates may have helped him by supplying the booklets to
new patents,
nowhere in the record can it be found that he delegated to
them his duty to obtain patients’ informed consent . . . Even
assuming . . . that he had, Dr. O’Brien still would have been
liable for failure to obtain [the patient’s] informed consent,
since “[e]ven an effective delegation does not relieve the
delegating party . . . of its duty.” 176

B. THE SHINAL V. TOMS DECISIONS
This litigation arises out of surgery to remove a noncancerous brain tumor near the plaintiff’s pituitary gland. 177 The
issue was whether the neurosurgeon obtained the patient’s
informed consent prior to the operation to remove a recurring
lesion.178 Dr. Toms testified that he informed the patient, Mrs.
Shinal, of the risks of the surgery including possible damage to
170. 739 N.W.2d 15, 32 (S.D. 2007).
171. Id at 18.
172. Id. at 19.
173. Id. at 18.
174. Id. at 32.
175. Veith, 739 N.W.2d at 32.
176. Id. (quoting E. ALLEN F ARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 742 (Aspen Law & Business,
3d ed. 1999)).
177. Shinal v. Toms, 122 A.3d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2015), rev’d, 162 A.3d 429,
433 (Pa. 2017).
178. Id.
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the nearby carotid arteries and optic nerve. 179 The doctor
presented two options; a less aggressive approach which carried
a reduced survival rate since the tumor could grow back, or the
more aggressive surgery that had a better prognosis. 180 However,
Mrs. Shinal denied having any recollection of this conversation
including being informed of the risks of mortality or
complications.181
A short time later, the Mrs. Shinal spoke to the the surgeon’s
physician assistant by telephone and discussed the date of the
operation, the scarring that surgery would cause, and whether
radiation therapy would be needed. 182 Mrs. Shinal followed up
this call with a face-to-face meeting with the PA at which time
she executed the informed consent form which set forth the risks
of the surgery such as “pain, scarring, . . . heart attack, stroke,
injury and death” and stated that the patient understood its
contents, had the opportunity to ask questions, and was satisfied
with the answers. 183
During the operation, the physician allegedly punctured Mrs.
Shinal’s carotid artery and she suffered a brain bleed, stroke, and
partial blindness. 184 Mrs. Shinal and her husband filed suit against
the neurosurgeon and hospital for the failure to obtain the
patient’s knowledgeable informed consent under the Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act. 185 The
MCARE Act states in part:
(a) Duty of physicians . . . a physician owes a duty to a
patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient . . . prior
to conducting the following procedures: (1) Performing
surgery . . . .
(b) Description of the procedure.—Consent is informed if
the patient has been given a description of a procedure set
forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a

179. Id. at 1070.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Shinal, 122 A.3d at 1070.
183. Id. at 1072-73. See also Bill Shields & Tom Hoffman, The Dangers of
Delegation, ACR BULLETIN, https://acrbulletin.org/165-jan18/1455-dangers-of-delegation
[https://perma.cc/DZE7-7X2U] (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
184. Shields & Hoffman, supra note 183.
185. Shinal, 122 A.3d at 1066. See also MCARE Act, 40 PA. S TAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1303.504(a)-(b) (West 2002).
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reasonably prudent patient would require to make an
informed decision as to that procedure. The physician shall
be entitled to present evidence of the description of that
procedure and those risks and alternatives that a physician
acting in accordance with accepted medical standards of
medical practice would provide.186

Before trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the hospital concluding that “the duty to obtain informed consent
was personal to Dr. Toms.” 187 Upon the conclusion of the trial,
the judge charged the jury that they were permitted to consider
the information provided by the defendant’s qualified staff as part
of the informed consent process.188 The jury returned with a
defense verdict and the plaintiffs appealed claiming that this
charge was erroneous and prejudicial. 189
The intermediate appellate court upheld the verdict and
noted that the validity of the patient’s consent is premised upon
the scope of the information provided and not the identity of the
person communicating the information. 190 That determination is
consistent with prior case law since the “the primary interest of
Pennsylvania jurisprudence in regard to informed consent is that
of having the patient informed of all the material facts from which
he can make an intelligent choice as to his course of
treatment[.]”191 This court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the cases used by the trial court to support the jury instruction
were pre-MCARE act, and therefore, preempted. 192
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this
determination in a divided opinion by holding that the physician
has a non-delegable duty to inform the patient of the risks and
alternatives of a procedure. 193 This can only be accomplished by
186. 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(a)-(b) (West 2002) (emphasis
in original).
187. Shinal, 122 A.3d at 1070 (citing Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d
1232, 1239 (Pa. 2002)).
188. Id. at 1073.
189. Id. at 1079.
190. Id. (citing Foflygen v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 723 A.2d 705, 711 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999)).
191. Id. (quoting Bulman v. Myers, 467 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)).
192. Shinal, 122 A.3d at 1079 (the Plaintiffs argued that Bulman and Foflygen were
different because they involved nurses and not a physician’s assistant).
193. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 453 (Pa. 2017) (overruling Shinal v. Toms, 122
A.3d 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)). The importance of the informed issued is demonstrated by
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the physician through a direct discussion with the patient which
may not be delegated to another staff member. 194
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court
“misapplied the existing common law and the MCARE Act” by
instructing, and then clarifying, to the jury that information given
by any qualified person employed by Dr. Toms was to be taken
into consideration to determine whether the plaintiff received
proper informed consent. 195 In its analysis, the Court noted that
informed consent is about protecting the “patient’s bodily
integrity and autonomy” in deciding whether to allow a medical
procedure.196 Also, “[w]ithout the meeting of the minds” the
patient would not completely understand what is being done to
his or her body which violates the requirement of consent. 197
The Court pointed out that the superior courts in Bulman and
Foflygen erred in deciding that it is the scope of the information
received that matters, regardless of whether the doctor or a
member of the staff relayed it to the patient, because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held that this duty is
non-delegable.198 The Court analogized its reasoning with the
general rule that a hospital has no duty to obtain a patient’s
informed consent, or even ensure that the physician obtains
informed consent from the patient because the duty belongs solely
to the physician. 199 This is based on the fact that if the physician
is not the one speaking with the patient directly, then they cannot
be sure that the patient understands the procedure, risks and
options.200 Further, if the patient is to trust the physician’s
knowledge, training and expertise, it is up to the physician to

the submission of Amicus Curiae briefs by the Hospital and Health Systems Association of
Pennsylvania, the American Medical Association, the Pennsylvania Medical Society and the
Pennsylvania Association of Justice. Id. at 432.
194. Id. at 453.
195. Id. at 451.
196. Id. at 452.
197. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 452.
198. Id. at 453 (citing Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa.
2002)). The attorneys for Dr. Toms admitted in tupreme court brief that “it remains the
doctor’s duty to obtain informed consent, but the doctor is not required to supply all of the
information himself; it is the information conveyed not the person conveying it, that is at
issue.” Brief for Appellee Steven A. Toms, M.D. at 51, Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (2016)
(No. 31 MAP 2016).
199. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 453.
200. Id.
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“cultivate a relationship with the patient” so that the physician
understands the patient’s expectations. 201
To allow a doctor to delegate to a member of the staff the
delivery of critical information undermines the patient’s
autonomy and the physician-patient relationship.202 The Court
also held that according to the plain language of the MCARE Act,
the duty to obtain informed consent is with the physician. 203
Specifically, the MCARE Act focuses on the duty of the
physician and not just whether the patient receives the
information.204 Last, the Court mentioned that even Dr. Toms
testified that he does not delegate the obligation to obtain
informed consent because he believes that informed consent is “a
real compact between the surgeon and the patient that he or she
trusts me with their life[,] and I need to know they understand that
this is serious, bad things could happen.” 205
The dissenting justices opined that the majority “makes a
leap in logic” by concluding that the language of the MCARE Act
precludes the physician from receiving help from qualified staff
members in order to fulfill the doctor’s duty to obtain informed
consent.206 While this is a non-delegable duty, the MCARE Act
does not expressly require that only physicians can provide the
information to the patient. 207 Instead, the statute merely requires
that the patient receive the applicable information. 208 “To hold
otherwise improperly injects the judiciary into the day-to-day
tasks of physicians such as Dr. Toms and fails to acknowledge the
reality of the practice of medicine.” 209
The Shinal court has given patients an unprecedented degree
of protection210 and several attorneys noted that the decision
would “sow confusion in the medical industry and lead to an
201. Id. at 453-54.
202. Id. at 454.
203. Id.
204. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 454. See also MCARE Act, 40 PA. S TAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1303.504(a)-(b) (West 2002).
205. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 455.
206. Id. at 457.
207. Id. at 458.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. GERALD A. MCH UGH & JOSEPH Z. TRAUB, A Summary of Pennsylvania’s
Current Standard as to Informed Consent, 3 WEST’S PA. PRAC., TORTS: L AW AND
ADVOCACY § 8.3 (Supp. 2017).
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uptick in legal disputes.”211 Some engaged in clinical trials have
been confused by the ruling and are approaching the opinion from
a risk-based perspective. Many are taking a “wait–and–see”
approach and are enlisting the assistances of legal experts as they
figure out how to reorganize to comply with the new legal
mandate.212
Needless to say, attorneys for claimants are fully supportive
of the ruling. Michael F. Barrett, Esq., a leading malpractice
lawyer, felt that the Court’s prohibition against a physician’s
delegation of responsibility for informing a patient of the risks
and alternatives of a procedure to a non-physician, such as a
physician assistant or nurse, is appropriate, sensible, reasonable
and fair.213 Clifford A. Rieders, Esquire, another plaintiff’s
malpractice attorney, fully supports the Shinal decision, noting
that anyone who has worked with physicians fully understands
the importance of a physician providing informed consent,
explaining risks and alternatives to a patient, and being personally
present to answer questions.214
As one might imagine, however, the decision has caused
quite a stir as healthcare providers scramble to comply with this
new mandate. As Michael L. Brooks, a neuro-radiologist at a
suburban Philadelphia Hospital and attorney finds that the ruling
has disrupted things throughout the hospital. 215 While no other
published opinion has yet to cite the decision in an attempt to
prevent doctors from asking others to inform their patients of the
risks and alternatives to a procedure, a number of medical
organizations have warned their members about the decision. In
fact, the American Medical Association published an article while
211. Max Mitchell, In Wake of Informed Consent Ruling, Med Mal Lawyers Raising
Questions,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(Aug.
4,
2018,
7:49
PM),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202794800155/In-Wake-of-InformedConsent-Ruling-Med-Mal-Lawyers-Raising-Questions [https://perma.cc/2CZ2-TDLM].
212. Darshan Kulkarni et al., How Does Shinal v. Toms Affect Informed Consent in
Pennsylvania
Trials,
APPLIED
C LINICAL
TRIALS
(Dec.
1,
2017),
http://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/how-does-shinal-v-toms-affect-informedconsent-pennsylvania-clinical-trials [https://perma.cc/4F3V-LG6M].
213. Interview with Michael F. Barrett, Senior Partner, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett &
Bendesky (Mar. 22, 2018).
214. Interview with Clifford Reiders, Partner, Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Waters &
Dohrmann (Mar. 27, 2018).
215. Interview with Michael L. Brooks, Doctor, Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital (Mar. 21,
2018).
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the case was pending alerting physicians that the matter “could
have major implications on how physicians obtain informed
consent prior to surgery.”216 Another journal opined that the
impact of the decision is already being felt in clinical trials were
informed consent mandates are even more stringent than in
clinical medicine. 217 It was predicated that requiring researchers
to meet with their patients will slow down even more an already
time-consuming informed consent process.218
Dr. Alexander R. Vaccaro, Professor and Chair of the
Department of Orthopedic Surgery at Thomas Jefferson Hospital,
is of the opinion that the physician must have a discussion with a
patient regarding the risks and benefits of any surgical procedure
but the information should never be discounted even if it didn’t
come directly from the mouth of the physician provider. 219
Richard P. Kidwell, Senior Associate Counsel and Vice
President of Risk Management at the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, believes that the court’s ruling highlights the
important role informed consent plays in patient safety, and that
it must consist of a discussion in which the physician clearly
states the risks of the procedure, expected benefits, and available
alternatives, including the option of not undergoing the
treatment.220 He does not believe, however, that the decision will
gain large traction outside of Pennsylvania because of the specific
way the informed consent statute is drafted in the
Commonwealth.221 Counsel also does not consider the opinion to
be overly draconian and believes that it is limited to surgical
procedures and not to such things as endoscopic examinations,

216. Troy Parks, Medical Liability Suit Seeks Change to Informed Consent for
Surgery, AMA WIRE (Aug. 19, 2016), https://wire.ama-assn.org/practicemanagement/medical-liability-suit-seeks-change-informed-consent-surgery
[https://perma.cc/H529-C5K7].
217. Darhan Kulkarni & Erin Grant, What Impact Will the Shinal Case Have on
Informed Consent in Clinical Research, 13 J. CLINICAL RES. & BEST PRACS. 1, 3 (Sept.
2017), https://www.firstclinical.com/journal/2017/1709_Shinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/94NZ9H3J].
218. Id.
219. Interview with Alexander R. Vacarro, Professor & Chairman, Department of
Orthopedic Surgery at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, in Philadelphia. (Mar. 23,
2018).
220. Telephone Interview with Richard P. Kidwell, Senior Associate Counsel & Vice
President of Risk Management, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (Mar. 21, 2018).
221. Id.
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radiation used for diagnostic purposes, spinal taps and
catheterizations. 222 Mr. Kidwell goes on to note that “fellows and
residents may obtain informed consent for blood transfusions and
residents can obtain consent for procedures that their departments
determine they are qualified to perform on their own.”223
The Shinal decision did prompt the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center to change its Policy and Procedure Manual on
informed consent.224 That new policy provides in Section III:
1. Except as noted below, Attending Physicians Are
Responsible For Obtaining Informed Consent. The
attending physician overseeing the patient’s care is
responsible for and must obtain informed consent for all
procedures that require informed consent. The attending
shall sign the consent form after the consent discussion
occurs. Residents or fellows may only obtain informed
consent for blood or blood products or for procedures their
departments have deemed them qualified to perform.
2. Advanced Practice Providers or Medical Students
May Not Obtain Informed Consent for the enumerated
items in II A. Advanced practice providers may obtain
consent for and perform procedures for which they are
credentialed to so.
3. Nurses May Not Obtain Informed Consent.
NOTE: Residents, fellows, advanced practice providers,
medical students and nurses may assist the attending
physician with the informed consent process by serving
as a witness or by presenting the patient with the
informed consent form. 225

Interestingly, while Ohio has not adopted the Shinal ruling,
it already prohibits a nurse from obtaining a patient’s informed
consent and limits them to acting as a witness and signing the
consent document.226 However, a resident is allowed to secure the
form unless the physician is not competent to perform the
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Patient Informed Consent, Policy HS-RI1302, UPMC Policy and Procedure
Manual (Oct. 5, 2017) (on file with the Arkansas Law Review).
225. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
226. Joint
Commission
Update,
CIN.
C.
MED.,
http://med2.uc.edu/libraries/gme_forms/joint_commission_upd_1.sflb.ashx
[https://perma.cc/9FUR-NLVU] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
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procedure in question in which case the attending doctor remains
liable to guarantee that the patient receives the necessary
information.227 Also, the resident can only intercede in those
procedures in which he or she is competent to answers the
patient’s questions.228
Informed consent, however, is a two-way street. Patients
must listen to what the doctor is explaining and ask questions if
they do not understand, or if they desire more comprehensive
information.229 Unfortunately, many individuals do not
comprehend the explanation provided and have already made up
their minds to have the procedure performed. Research pertaining
to surgery has revealed: “[A]dequate overall understanding of the
information provided and of the risks associated with surgery was
shown” to be a paltry 29%. 230 This lack of understanding is a
reflection of the patient’s education, literacy and language
proficiency, as well as the doctor’s skill in adequately explaining
the procedure and risks. 231 The logic behind informed consent is
certainly a logical and ethical mandate, but in view of these
statistics and problems, should the identity of the person who
talks to the patient be such a critical issue? It would seem that the
patient’s receipt of the appropriate information in an
understandable format is a much more desirable goal.
Nevertheless, if the doctor does delegate the duty, he remains
liable if the staff does not do a competent job.

IV. CONCLUSION
Informed consent is deeply rooted in the ethical concept of
patient autonomy and fundamental human rights. First introduced
to the American public in 1914, informed consent has undergone
a metamorphosis over the years as health care providers and the
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Understanding Informed Consent and Your Rights as a Patient, F INDLAW,
http://healthcare.findlaw.com/patient-rights/understanding-informed-consent-a-primer.html
[https://perma.cc/49FB-FX7R] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
230. Mathew Falagas et al., Informed Consent: How Much and What Do Patients
Understand? 198 AM. J. SURGERY 420, 420 (2009).
231. Anne Sherlock & Sonya Brownie, Patients’ Recollection and Understanding of
Informed Consent: A Literature Review, WILEY ONLINE L IBRARY (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ans.12555
[https://perma.cc/H59VUDW7].
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courts struggle over the meaning of the phrase and how much
information should be shared with the patient. Everyone agrees
that the patient must be told about the nature of the illness and the
reasonable risks and alternatives associated with the treatment.
This information must also be explained in a clear, accurate, and
compassionate manner.
However, these clear and noble mandates have become
blurred as lawsuits are continually filed to expand the type of
information that should be provided. Claims for lack of informed
consent have become physician-specific and are focused on such
things as a doctor’s failure to disclose that he or she has been the
subject of prior lawsuits or disciplinary action, a physician’s
alcohol or drug dependency and whether the doctor has a
monetary interest in a technique.
Two recent challenges deal with the liability of the various
health care providers who participate in the informed consent
process and whether the treating physician may delegate the duty
to explain the risks and alternatives of a procedure to another. 232
This push to expand liability has resulted in the split decision of
Shinal v. Toms, which now mandates that the physician have a
one-on-one exchange with the patient in order to secure a valid
informed consent.233
Informed consent, however, is a two-way street and little
attention is paid to the fact that a number of patients fail to listen
to or grasp what the healthcare professional is explaining or to ask
questions if they do not understand that explanation. The fact is
that many have already decided to have the procedure and do not
properly weigh the possibility that something can go wrong until
it happens to them. When it is discovered that the physician did
nothing wrong and the outcome is an associated risk of the
operation, lack of informed consent becomes the focus of
liability.
Shinal v. Toms has now provided the patient with an
unprecedented degree of protection by mandating that only the
physician may discuss the risks and alternatives of a procedure
with the individual. 234 In view of the fact that most patients have
232. Bulman v. Myers, 467 A.2d 1353 (Pa. Super. 1983); Veith v. O’Brien, 739 N.W.
2d 15 (S.D. 2007).
233. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 453.
234. Id. at 455.
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already decided to undergo the procedure or surgery, does it really
matter which health care professional explains the dangers of an
operation as long as the patient receives the appropriate
information in a clear, accurate, and compassionate manner?

